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Abstract
John S. Bell is well known for the result now referred to simply as
“Bell’s theorem,” which removed from serious consideration by physics
of local hidden-variable theories. Under these circumstances, if quan-
tum theory is to serve as a truly fundamental theory, conceptual preci-
sion in its interpretation is not only even more desirable but paramount.
John Bell was accordingly concerned about what he viewed as con-
ceptual imprecision, from the physical point of view, in the standard
approaches to the theory. He saw this as most acute in the case of
their treatment of measurement at the level of principle. Bell pointed
out that conceptual imprecision is reflected in the terminology of the
theory, a great deal of which he deemed worthy of banishment from dis-
cussions of principle. For him, it corresponded to a set of what he saw
as vague and, in some instances, outright destructive concepts. Here,
I consider this critique of standard quantum measurement theory and
some alternative treatments wherein he saw greater conceptual preci-
sion, and make further suggestions as to how to proceed along the lines
he advocated.
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1 Introduction
John S. Bell is well known for the result now referred to simply as “Bell’s the-
orem,” which removed from consideration the class of so-called local hidden-
variable theories which at the time of its publishing appeared to be the most
natural class of theories among those that would render quantum mechanics
a form of statistical mechanics. If, as this and other results suggest, quantum
theory is to serve as a truly fundamental theory, conceptual precision in its
interpretation is not only desirable but paramount. John Bell was accordingly
concerned about what he viewed as conceptual imprecision, from the physical
point of view, in the standard approaches to the theory. He saw this as most
acute in the case of their treatment of measurement at the level of principle.
His concerns were strongly expressed in one of his last articles, “Against Mea-
surement.” This item was published in 1990 in a volume of proceedings of the
1989 Erice meeting “Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty,” during which it was my
pleasure to meet and eat with Bell, and to listen to him present this paper.
He pointed out that this conceptual imprecision is reflected in the terminology
of the foundations of quantum theory, a great deal of which he deemed worthy
of banishment from discussions of principle, because it corresponds to a set of
what he saw as vague and, in some instances, outright destructive concepts.
His concern was not one regarding the mathematics so much as regarding basic
concepts used in contemporary quantum physics, which he viewed as failing to
satisfy the needs of natural philosophy and so of physics, despite their appar-
ent practical adequacy. Here, I consider Bell’s critique of standard quantum
measurement theory and some alternative treatments wherein he saw greater
conceptual precision, and make further suggestions as to how to improve con-
ceptual precision, as he advocated.
That the source of difficulties is to be understood specifically as a prob-
lem of imprecision of physical concepts which stands in the way of the achieve-
ment of an exact fundamental mechanical theory is pointed out at the outset
of “Against measurement” (AM): Bell wished to make it clear “at once that
it is not mathematical precision, but physical” that caused him such great
concern. As he saw it, physics should have had by the time of its writing “an
exact formulation of a serious part of mechanics,” where by exact he meant
“only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with
nothing left to the discretion of the theoretical physicist,” with nonrelativistic
‘particle’ quantum mechanics and that of the electromagnetic field constituting
a sufficiently “serious part” (Bell, 1991a). Bell also made it immediately clear
that he saw physics as part of the long tradition of natural philosophy, and
that his concerns about physical precision are, in effect, concerns regarding
the precision of concepts of natural philosophy.
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In the analysis offered in AM, a key distinction, made with regard to
theoretical treatments compatible with experimental data obtained, is that
between those sufficiently precise to be accepted as fundamental physics and
those good enough “for all practical purposes,” for which he supplied the mem-
orable acronym ‘FAPP’ (which, following his usage, continues to be employed
in this sense now, two and one half decades later). Bell’s exploration begins by
pointing out that there is a lack of precision in the traditional, “proper treat-
ments” one finds published in respectable and frequently consulted sources.
He recalls and answers the often-asked rhetorical question of why one should
bother making quantum mechanics more precise than it already is: “Why not
look it up in a good book? But which good book? Usually the good unprob-
lematic formulation is still in the head of the person in question. . . For the good
books known to me are not much concerned with physical precision.” His ver-
dict on those various available treatments that are set firmly within quantum
theory involving the standard, unmodified dynamical laws is that they are
useful for the practical prediction of the statistics to be found in experiments
but fall far short of what physics ought to be at the level of principle: “The
orthodox approaches, whether the authors think they have made derivations
or assumptions, are just fine FAPP” but ultimately fail to fully describe the
physical world (Bell, 1991).
Bell provides a lengthy laundry list of standard quantum physical terms,
reflection upon which shows that the lack of physical precision in the then cur-
rent thinking—from which, it should be noted out, we have yet to significantly
advance—is due to conceptual imprecision, and suggests that physics reject a
considerable amount of this standard terminology.
“Here are some words which, however legitimate and necessary in
application, have no place in a formulation with any pretension of
physical precision: system, apparatus, environment, microscopic,
macroscopic, reversible, irreversible, observable, information, mea-
surement. The concepts of ‘system’, ‘apparatus’, ‘environment’,
immediately imply an artificial division of the world, and an inten-
tion to neglect, or take only schematic account of, the interaction
across the split. The notions of ‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’
defy precise definition. So also do the notions of ‘reversible’ and
‘irreversible’. Einstein said that it is theory which decides what is
‘observable’. I think he was right — ‘observation’ is a complicated
and theory-laden business. Then that notion should not appear in
the formulation of fundamental theory.” (Bell, 1991)
The ages old philosophical question of the relationship of observation
to reality is relevant to the issues discussed in the article, but is itself not en-
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gaged in the text in any detail, beyond a general rejection of subjectivism. It
suffices here to note that in his writings generally, Bell sides with realism and
in AM refers positively to the views of one of its great physicist-champions on
this issue. His primary concern instead is more specifically the relationship
of physical theory to reality, and his position is that, at a minimum, physical
theory should should explain to the physicist what can and cannot be mea-
sured, something given by the answer to the question of how measurements are
and can be made without themselves being considered fundamental to physical
theory.
2 The Negative Influence of Inappropriate Ter-
minology
As Bell saw it in AM, “On this list of bad words from good books, the worst of
all is ‘measurement’.” Again, he does not reject the term in general, particu-
larly not its use in practice and mentioned that in the command “measure the
mass and width of the Z boson” as an example of acceptable use of it. He ob-
jected, rather, and most specifically to “its use in the fundamental interpretive
rules of quantum mechanics.” Bell considered the problems as arising through
the use of ‘measurement’ in the foundations of quantum theory, commenting
that, when reading of Dirac’s “good book” Quantum mechanics, one gets the
sense that “the theory is exclusively concerned about ‘the results of measure-
ment’, and has nothing to say about anything else” but, he asks rhetorically,
“What qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ‘measurer’?” (Bell,
1991).
Bell suggests that the role of the notion of measurement be taken over
by the more neutral term ‘experiment’: “Even in a low-brow practical account,
I think it would be good to replace the word ‘measurement’, in the formulation,
by the word ‘experiment’. For the latter word is altogether less misleading.”
But, this move also has limitations.
“However, the idea that quantum mechanics, our most fundamen-
tal physical theory, is exclusively about the results of experiments
would remain disappointing. . . . To restrict quantum mechanics to
be exclusively about piddling laboratory operations is to betray
the great enterprise [of natural philosophy]. A serious formulation
will not exclude the big world outside the laboratory.” (Bell, 1991)
He finds use of the term ‘experiment’ tolerable in the formulation of quantum
mechanics but best avoided if possible. The term ‘measurement,’ however, is
“entirely inappropriate.” He makes two specific charges against the term:
4
“The first charge against ‘measurement’, in the fundamental ax-
ioms of quantum mechanics, is that it anchors there the shifty split
of the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. A second charge is that
the word comes loaded with meaning from everyday life, mean-
ing which is entirely inappropriate in the quantum context . . . In
other contexts, physicists have been able to take words from every-
day language and use them as technical terms with no great harm
done . . .Would that it were so with ‘measurement’. But in fact
the word has had such a damaging effect on the discussion, that I
think it should now be banned altogether in quantum mechanics.”
(Bell, 1991)
Beyond the general difficulties of its use of this most problematic term,
Bell sees the traditional, “orthodox” treatment of measurement-like processes
as reinforcing the imprecision of the enterprise of quantum natural philosophy
in several ways. He also objects to any distinction between systems based on
imprecise reference to physical scale, where the term ‘macroscopic’ is brought
into play.
“The kinematics of the world, in this orthodox picture [with prob-
abilities of obtaining outcomes], is given by a wavefunction (maybe
more than one?) for the quantum part, and classical variables —
variables that have values — for the classical part: (Ψ(t, q, . . .), X(t . . . . . .)).
The Xs are somehow macroscopic. This is not spelled out very ex-
plicitly. The dynamics is not very precisely formulated either.”
(Bell, 1991)
‘Macroscopic’ is another term set for banning. Bell had expressed concern with
that term in previous years as well, but he had previously seen a sharpening
of the concept as still viable; he had commented, for example, that in regard
to the ‘EPR correlations’ which violated his inequality that he had “very little
understanding of the position of. . . Bohr,” which depended on restrictions on
what is to be considered possible in measurements and made use of the term
(Bell, 1981a). In his 1981 article entitled “Bertlmann’s socks and the nature of
reality,” Bell indicated as one possibility for progress in foundations of quan-
tum theory that “it may be that Bohr’s intuition was right—in that here is no
reality below some ‘classical’ ‘macroscopic’ level. Then fundamental physical
theory would remain fundamentally vague, until concepts like ‘macroscopic’
could be made sharper than they are today” (Bell, 1981a).
In a comment on this paper made directly after its presentation by
Bell contemporary, his friend and contemporary Abner Shimony—who, along
with John Clauser, Michael Horne, and Richard Holt provided a directly ex-
perimentally testable form of Bell’s inequality (Clauser, Horne, Shimony and
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Holt, 1969)—may have influenced Bell’s thinking regarding measurement when
he remarked that
“perhaps I can help to focus on the source of the difficulty [in un-
derstanding Bohr’s answer to E.P.R.]. In any measuring process,
Bohr insists upon a sharp distinction between object and subject.
The apparatus is considered to be situated on the subject’s side
of this division. Hence it is characterized in terms of the con-
cepts of everyday life (of which the concepts of classical physics
are refinements). One may ask, however, whether it is possible to
investigate the physical behavior of the apparatus. . . Bohr’s answer
is that. . . [it] is possible but then other apparatus will be employed
in the investigation. The boundary between the object and the
subject has shifted.” (Bell, 1981a)
By the time of AM Bell was referring to this division exactly as “the shifty
split.”
The focus of the critique in AM is in fact most specifically on the
conceptual imprecision involved in the treatment of state evolution during
measurement that depends on the above (as Bell sees it) problematic system–
apparatus division, which is typically made by having the apparatus, in one
way or the other, qualify as ‘macroscopic.’ Bell notes that a range of different,
often incompatible assumptions as to how a system can be considered to be
macroscopic have been used in the standard approaches to quantum measure-
ment (cf. Jaeger, 2014a). In AM, Bell analyzes the traditional treatments,
which invoke sudden changes of quantum state during experiments, making
use of the following distinction “It will be convenient later to refer to. . . the
spontaneous jump of a macroscopic system [S] into a definite configuration, as
the [Landau–Lifschitz] LL jump. And the forced jump of a quantum system
as a result of ‘measurement’ — external intervention — as the Dirac jump.”
A “jump” placed in the same location as the latter appears in the formulation
of von Neumann; the postulate of state collapse according to von Neumann is
also noted in the text: “what vN actually postulates is that ‘measurement’ —
an external intervention by [the rest of the world] R on S — causes the state∑
n
cnφn to jump, with various probabilities into φ1 or φ2 or. . . From the ‘or’
here, replacing the ‘and’, as a result of external intervention, vN infers that
the density matrix, averaged over the several possibilities, has no interference
terms between states of the system which correspond to different measurement
results.” It is this invocation of measurement at the level of postulates that
Bell found extremely objectionable.
Von Neumann was clearly forced to postulate such a process, which
he called “Process 1,” pointing out its exceptional nature by noting that, on
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physical grounds, one would rather expect the more usual Process 2 to be the
only one needed.
“[O]ne should expect that [Process 2] would suffice to describe the
intervention caused by a measurement: Indeed, a physical interven-
tion can be nothing else than the temporary insertion of a certain
energy coupling into the observed system, i.e., the introduction of
an appropriate time dependency of Hˆ.” (Von Neumann, 1932)
Von Neumann had argued that the boundary between the measuring and mea-
sured systems should also be “arbitrary to a very large extent” (Von Neumann,
1955, p. 420) because whether the collapse happens to the measured system
alone or to the joint system of measuring apparatus together with the mea-
sured system, the statistics of outcomes will be the same from the point of
view of any physical system, such as a that of a human being, separate from
them that becomes correlated with them in the same way a measurement is
assumed to become during an experiment. Although this is true, it does not
aid our understanding of what takes place during measurement, but instead
leaves its details obscure. This is very clearly a case of a theory working, but
working only “FAPP.”
Bell then surveys other traditional treatments in other “good books,”
indicating the various instances of physical imprecision within them. In the
case of the treatment of Landau and Lifschitz (LL), which “derive[s] the Dirac
jump from the LL jump,” he says “In the LL formulation. . . the theory is am-
biguous in principle, about exactly when and exactly how the collapse occurs,
about what is microscopic and what is macroscopic, what quantum and what
classical.” These, of course, are the most critical questions involved in a fuller
understanding of the quantum mechanics of experimentation. For this reason,
imprecision in relation to these obscures the problem itself, making it all the
more difficult to solve.
Bell also considers the treatment of Kurt Gottfried, and offers natural
suggestions for its missing details as part of an exploration of its more realistic
character. Formally, he takes this as a treatment in which the density matrix ρ
for the joint system of system S ′ = S+A, where A is the measurement appara-
tus system, is replaced by another density matrix ρˆ, in which all non-diagonal
elements are zero in the Hilbert space basis in which measured values and the
apparatus ‘pointer’ variable values are to be perfectly correlated, something
which is a prerequisite of an accurate measurement often postulated by re-
alist (as well as operationalist) interpretations of quantum theory. To Bell,
this appears to be because there is conceptual drift “away from the ‘measure-
ment’ (. . . external intervention) orientation of orthodox quantum mechanics
towards the idea that systems, such as S ′ above, have intrinsic properties —
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independently of and before observation. In particular, the readings of exter-
nal apparatus are supposed to be really there before they are read,” in that
explication of measurement in which “KG derives, FAPP, the LL jump from
assumptions at the shifted split R′/S ′, which include a Dirac jump there,”
where R′ = R− A. This is seen as having the advantage that some
“‘macroscopic’ ‘physical attributes’ have values at all times, with
a dynamics that is related somehow to the butchering of ρ into ρˆ
— which is seen as somehow not incompatible with the internal
Schro¨dinger equation of the system. Such a theory, assuming in-
trinsic properties, would not need external intervention, would not
need the shifty split, but the retention of the vague word ‘macro-
scopic’ would reveal limited ambitions as regards precision.” (Bell,
1991)
One might, he finally notes, avoid this term by introducing variables which
have values even at small scales, as in the deBroglie–Bohm approach.
Bell had previously viewed the deBroglie–Bohm approach as important,
in that it showed that “the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary
reference to the ‘observer,’ could be eliminated” (Bell, 1982). This indicates a
potentially promising direction for increased conceptual precision, one which
he sought to “publicize.” In this earlier discussion, he drew three morals from
the existence of the deBroglie–Bohm model: (1) “Always test your general
reasoning against simple models,” (2) “in physics the only observations we
must consider are position observations, if only the positions of instrument
pointers,” and (3) one concerning terminology that was to be the main theme
of “Against measurement.” In the paper where these morals were drawn,
“On the impossible pilot wave,” Bell notes regarding (3) that “serious people”
were likely “misled by the pernicious misuse of the word ‘measurement”’ which
“strongly suggests the ascertaining of some preexisting property of some thing,
any instrument involved playing a purely passive role. Quantum experiments
are just not like that, as we learned especially from Bohr” (Bell, 1982).
However, as seen below, by the end of the 1980s, Bell found a different
approach more promising, one that deviates from standard quantum mechanics
at the level of law: Indeed, he had concluded already concluded by the time
of his article “Are there quantum jumps?” that “If, with Schro¨dinger, we
reject extra variables, then we must allow that his equation is not always
right. . . it seems to me inescapable. . . a recent idea [of Ghirardi, Rimini, and
Weber (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, 1985)], a specific form of spontaneous
wavefunction collapse, is particularly simple and effective” (Bell, 1987).
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3 Modified Quantum Dynamics
3.1 The Desiderata and Superpositions at Large Scales
In addition to their common use of notions of measurement and macroscopic-
ity, standard analyses of quantum mechanical situations, as viewed from the
perspective of data production, suffer from what has been called the “oppor-
tunistic employment of the superposition principle.” That is, one is tempted
to allow the superposition principle to operate whenever convenient and not
operate whenever inconvenient, as opposed to understanding via specific basic
quantities precisely when it may or may not be in force. This issue was taken
up by Shimony in his article “Desiderata for a modified quantum dynamics,”
presented in a memorial session for Bell, wherein he also noted that “At a
workshop at Amherst College in June Bell remarked that the stochastic mod-
ification of quantum dynamics is the most important new idea in the field of
foundations of quantum mechanics during his professional lifetime” (Shimony,
1991).
It is clear in AM that Bell viewed the modification of the standard
quantum dynamics and presence or absence of state superposition as impor-
tant, in that it is a move that provides an opportunity to correct at least
some of the forms of imprecision noted above by providing objectivity to the
circumstances under which measurement-like events would or would not take
place. It is, therefore, worth looking more closely at the context in which such
theories can be developed. This is just want Shimony does in “Desiderata...”,
by spelling out four assumptions “concerning the interpretation of the quan-
tum mechanical formalism have the consequence of making the [measurement
problem and the problem of Schro¨dinger’s cat] so serious that it is difficult
to envisage their solution without some modification of the formalism itself.”
These assumptions, variously sanctioned in AM, are generally “strongly sup-
ported by physical and philosophical considerations, and therefore a high price
would be paid by sacrificing one of them in order to hedge standard quantum
mechanics against modifications.” They are the following (Shimony, 1991).
(i) “The quantum state of a physical system is an objective char-
acterization of it.” (As Bell puts it in AM, a “serious formulation
will not exclude the big world outside the laboratory” and will not
be concerned exclusively with “piddling laboratory operations.”)
(ii) Connected with Bell’s theorem: “The objective characteriza-
tion of a physical system by its quantum state is complete, so that
an ensemble of systems described by the same quantum state is ho-
mogeneous, without any differentiations stemming from differences
in ‘hidden variables.’ ”
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(iii) “Quantum mechanics is the correct framework theory for all
physical systems, macroscopic as well as microscopic, and hence
it specifically applies to measuring apparatuses.” (About which,
however, it should be noted that “The main consideration in favor
of [it being] the incompatibility proved by Bell (1987, pp.14-21
and 29-39) between quantum mechanics and local hidden variables
theories, but Bell himself emphasizes that there is still an option
of non-local hidden variables theories, which he does not regard
as completely repugnant.” Furthermore, this assumption has in
Bell’s eyes the implication that all variants of the Copenhagen
interpretation are “ruled out.”)
(iv) “At the conclusion of the physical stages of a measurement
(and hence, specifically, before the mind of an observer is affected),
a definite result occurs from among all those possible outcomes
(potentialities) compatible with the initial state of the object.”
(Bell is skeptical even of having biology pertinent to measurement
induction—hence his comment regarding collapse “Was the wave-
function of the world waiting to jump for thousands of years until
a single-celled living creature appeared. . . or some better qualified
system . . . with a PhD?” (Bell, 1981b)
Shimony then sets out a list of eight well supported desiderata for such a
dynamics, the last pertaining critically to the proposal Bell looked to, namely,
that of GRW.
“The modified dynamics should be capable of accounting for the
occurrence of definite outcomes of measurements performed with
actual apparatus, not just with idealized models of apparatus. The
Spontaneous Localization theory of [GRW ’86] has been criticized
for not satisfying this desideratum. . . Albert and Vaidman (Albert
1990, 156-8) note that the typical reaction of a measuring appara-
tus in practice is a burst of fluorescent radiation, or a pulse of volt-
age or current, and these are hard to subsume under the scheme of
measurement of the Spontaneous Localization theory.” (Shimony,
1991)
Shimony also notes difficulties in this approach and others pertaining to Bell’s
concern about irreversibility (which Bell says in AM also defies a precise con-
ceptual basis): “a stochastic modification of quantum dynamics can hardly
avoid introducing time-asymmetry. Consequently, it offers an explanation at
the level of fundamental processes for the general phenomenon of irreversibility,
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instead of attempting to derive irreversibility from some aspect of complexity
(which has the danger of confusing epistemological and ontological issues).”
Now, Bell was not the first to notice the imprecision of the traditional
approach to quantum measurement. Notably, Wigner—who had shown the
limitations of von Neumann’s arbitrariness of the location of the division in-
volved in his own measurement schema by showing that if a cognitive systems is
used as a measurement apparatus contradictions can appear (Wigner, 1963)—
pointed this out very clearly in his critique of one highly developed standard
treatment: In what was perhaps the most sophisticated treatment within that
approach, that of Danieri, Loingier and Prosperi, the three authors were said
by him to be “using phrases such as ‘macroscopic variables’ and ‘macroscopic
objects’ without giving a precise definition of these terms” (Freire, 2005) so
that, for example, their premisses could not be rigorously formulated. In re-
marks on Prosperi’s paper in a key meeting of measurement theorists at the
outset of the 1970s, which continued along the lines of the DLP approach,
Wigner noted specifically the inappropriateness of making use of “something
as inadequately defined as is the macroscopic nature of something” in serious
physical discussions (his remarks immediately follow the article of Prosperi
(1971)). He noted that “the theory of the interaction of a quantum system
with a classical (macroscopic) system has not been formulated so that the
mathematical meaning of the arrows [indicating the change of joint-system
state-vector upon measurement] is not clear” (Wigner, 1971, p. 7).
“[M]ost quantities which we believe to be able to measure, and
surely all the very important quantities such as position, momen-
tum, fail to commute with all the conserved quantities so that
their measurement cannot be possible with a microscopic appara-
tus. This raises the suspicion that the macroscopic nature of the
apparatus is necessary in principle and reminds us that our doubts
concerning the validity of the superposition principle for the mea-
surement process were connected with the macroscopic nature of
the apparatus.” (Wigner, 1971)
And this nature, now sometimes referred to by the term ‘macroscopicity’, is
not rigorously characterized within that approach.
In the years between Wigner’s critique and Bell’s later criticisms of tra-
ditional quantum measurement theory, Anthony Leggett had considered per-
forming tests for the quantum effects in “macroscopic systems,” preferrably
large material systems, to better illuminate the question of whether there is a
clear role for macroscopicity in measurement. Leggett still wishes to find “evi-
dence of a breakdown of the quantum mechanical scheme of the physical world
[in] that which connects the world of atoms and electrons, for which it was
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originally developed, with the ‘everyday’ world of our immediate experience,”
where quantum mechanically complementary properties appear compatible
(Leggett, 2002). In particular, he wishes to find superposition and, so, in-
terference effects DLP had argued should not occur during measurements (cf.
Home and Whittaker, 2002). For this purpose, Leggett has suggested studying
superconducting devices (SQUIDs) and the Josephson effect, in which states
of a current of electrons could, in principle, enter a superposition of states of
clockwise and/or anti-clockwise circulation (Leggett, 2000). Since the early
work of Leggett, ‘macroscopic’ has been increasingly defined in terms large
values of specific observable quantities, generalizing Bohr’s original belief that
heft and rigidity andx that of others simply that a sufficiently large number
of degrees of freedom are essential, rather than being identified via criteria
related to the resolution of naked eye, as the most direct understanding of the
meaning of the term would suggest (Jaeger, 2015).
Leggett has proposed a measure he calls disconnectivity D, a “semi-
quantitative” and “qualitatively defined” notion, claiming that “the quantum
states important in the discussion of the [cat] paradox are characterized by
a very high value of . . . ‘disconnectivity’; by contrast, the states necessary to
explain so-called ‘macroscopic quantum phenomena’ in superfluids and super-
conductivity have only low disconnectivity, so that they are irrelevant to our
question. . . ” (Leggett, 1980). Rather, these center on the “most promising
area to look [for high disconnectivity states is that of] phenomena where quan-
tum tunneling plays an essential role” (Leggett, 1980). The GRW approach
can be viewed as having participated in this trend as well.
3.2 Continuous Spontaneous Localization and Beables
It was the direction of GRW, shared by other workers such as Philip Pearle and
conveniently called continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) that Bell saw,
in the period in which AM appeared, as most clearly offering an alternative and
“explicit model allowing a unified description of microscopic and macroscopic
systems.” The starting point is one of “a modified quantum dynamics for
the description of macroscopic objects” in which systems of many components
have wave-functions that frequently spontaneously localize to small regions,
claiming that with it “most features of the behavior of macroscopic objects
are accounted for by quantum mechanics in a natural way, due to the irrelevant
spreads of wave packets for macroscopic masses” (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber,
1985).
The central parameters of interest in this model were laid out by GRW
as follows. “If one assumes for simplicity that the localization frequencies λi
of all microscopic (e.g., atomic) constituents of a macroscopic body are of the
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same magnitude. . . , the center of mass is affected by the same process with a
frequency λmacro = Nλmicro . . . where [the “macroscopic number”] N is of the
order of Avogadro’s number” (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, 1985). In response
to this work, Bell noted that
“In the GRW scheme this vagueness [regarding wavefunction col-
lapse] is replaced by mathematical precision. . . . departures of the
Schro¨dinger equation show up very rarely and very weakly in few-
particle systems. But in macroscopic systems, as a consequence of
the prescribed equations, pointers very rapidly point, and cats are
very quickly killed or spared.” (Bell, 1991).
Bell saw this aspect of the GRW approach in marked, positive contrast to
examples of ‘solutions’ of the measurement problem involving infinite limits
that had appeared, in particular, the 1972 model of Coleman and Hepp, where
a solution for the dynamics of a model apparatus consisting of a semi-infinite
array of spin-1/2 particles was given, which was viewed by some as a sort of
solution to the measurement problem. Bell was critical of the Coleman–Hepp
model, noting that, for it, “the rigorous reduction does not occur in physical
time but only in an unattainable mathematical limit. . . the distinction is an
important one” (Bell, 1975).
One difficulty subsequently encountered by the CSL approach is finding
a set of parameters that allow it to describe what is observed. This difficulty
is connected with what Bell called “beables,” those quantities which could
be understood realistically and which could correspond with what is actually
observed; those beables associated with local space-time regions are “local
beables.” Bell viewed contemporary quantum mechanics textbooks as failing
to focus on these quantities.
“What you may find there are the so-called ‘local observables’. It
is then implicit that the apparatus of the ‘observation’, or, bet-
ter, of experimentation, and the experimental results are real and
localized. We will have to do the best we can with these rather
ill-defined local beables, while hoping always for a more serious
reformulation of quantum mechanics where the local beables are
explicit and mathematical rather than implicit and vague” (Bell,
1990)
For their part, CSL theories have mainly followed what has been called the
mass density ontology (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zhang´ı, 2008), as ev-
idenced, for example, by the use of the parameter N above, to which mass
density would be proportional for systems built from a given sort of funda-
mental subsystem. For a system in a superposition of states with differing
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mass densities for which there is an operator, the larger the difference of the
mass density distribution of the states is, the more quickly a collapse will take
place. Thus, the collapse rate for superpositions states of microscopic systems
is low because the mass density differences are likewise low, and for superposi-
tions of macroscopic states it is large because the mass density differences are
likewise large.
However, there is a problem of persistent “tails” for any collapse pro-
cess that completes in finite time: State functions correspondence to perfectly
sharp values in position not obtained in finite time in cases where sharp values
obtained and it is admitted that “[f]or a macrosystem, the precisely applied
eigenstate–eigenvalue link does not work” (Pearle, 2009). At least one of the
longest and most active advocates of CSL, Pearle does not see this as preclud-
ing the success of the theory, despite Shimony’s desideratum which regards
tails specifically, namely,
“d. If a stochastic dynamical theory is used to account for the out-
come of a measurement, it should not permit excessive indefinite-
ness of the outcome, where “excessive” is defined by considerations
of sensory discrimination. This desideratum tolerates outcomes in
which the apparatus variable does not have a sharp point value, but
it does not tolerate ‘tails’ which are so broad that different parts of
the range of the variable can be discriminated by the senses, even if
very low probability amplitude is assigned to the tail. The reason
for this intolerance is implicit in Assumption (iv). . . If registration
on the consciousness of the observer of the measurement outcome
is more precise than the ‘tail’ indicates, then the physical part of
the measurement process would not yield a satisfactory reduction
of the initial superposition, and a part of the task of reducing the
superposition would thereby be assigned to the mind. For this rea-
son, I do not share the acquiescence to broad ‘tails’ that Pearle
advocates (1990, pp. 203-4). . . ” (Shimony, 1991)
Pearle has argued more recently, as he had once in Bell’s presence—at
the same Amherst conference mentioned above—that “one should not express
a new theory in an old theory’s language,” a comment “at which he beamed”
(Pearle, 2009). In particular, Pearle argues that “a collapse theory is different
from standard quantum theory and. . . therefore requires a new language, con-
ceptual as well as terminological” (Pearle). Emphasis is put, for example, on
“near possessed” rather than “possessed” values of physical quantities. In his
explication of CSL, Pearle argues that
“CSL retains the classical notion that the physical state of a sys-
tem corresponds to the state vector. Corresponding to a random
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field w(x, t) whose probability of occurrence is non-negligible, the
dynamics always evolves a realizable state. Therefore, one is freed
from requiring the (near) eigenstate-eigenvalue link criterion for
the purpose of selecting the realizable states. I suggest that the
eigenstate-eigenvalue link criterion be subsumed by a broader con-
cept. It must be emphasized that this new conceptual structure
is only applicable for a theory which hands you macroscopically
sensible realizable states, not superpositions of such states. In the
new language, corresponding to a quantum state, every variable
possesses a distribution of values. . . ” (Pearle, 2009)
The notions of this new ‘language’ are to be given meaning by considering
ways in which it is to be used in context. The distribution here is not to be
understood as a probability distribution, despite possessing all the defining
properties of one, because, argues Pearle, it is unlike classical physics where
probabilities are understood as due to ignorance. Here, one
“may give the name ‘stuff’ to a distribution’s numerical magnitude
at each value of the variable, as a generalization of Bell’s quasi-
biblical characterization, ‘In the beginning, Schro¨dinger tried to
interpret his wavefunction as giving somehow the density of the
stuff of which the world was made.’ One is encouraged to think
of each variable’s stuff distribution as something that is physically
real. The notion allows retention of the classical idea that, for a
physical state, every variable possesses an entity. What is different
from classical ideas is that the entity is not a number.” (Pearle,
2009)
(Note that Bell had used the term ‘stuff’ in the context of stochastic localiza-
tion theory in AM, as follows.
“The GRW-type theories have nothing in their kinematics but
wavefunctions. It gives the density (in a multi-dimensional con-
figuration space!) to stuff. To account for the narrowness of that
stuff in macroscopic dimensions, the linear Schro¨dinger equation
has to be modified, in the GRW picture by a mathematically pre-
scribed spontaneous collapse mechanism.” (Bell, 1991) )
On this view, every variable possesses such a distribution, so that “comple-
mentarity here means that variables whose operators do not commute do not
possess joint distributions, but they do jointly possess distributions” (Pearle,
2009). As an example, one can consider a state that is the quantum superpo-
sition of two, one with state amplitude
√
1− ǫ and the other with amplitude
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√
ǫ. Under the above interpretation, the smaller “tail” state is considered to
represent “an unobservably small amount of stuff which allows describing the
state vector by (qualified) possessed values assigned to macroscopic variables,
consistent with the dominant state” (Pearle, 2009).
As noted above, a central problem for CSL is finding parameter ranges
for which it would have experimental predictions deviating from those of stan-
dard quantum mechanics. Interference experiments are archetypical and could
serve to differentiate the two, because CSL tends to destroy interference in
that it naturally destroys one of the necessary pair distinct states in the case
of massive systems, with an interference visibility that decreases with the in-
crease in system mass. One might test the theory by considering, for example,
two-slit experiments on each of a range of sorts of systems differing in their
masses: photons, electrons, neutrons, atoms, and molecules. At one limit of
this range, one has the photons, of course, are massless, and CSL would have
no additional effect. In the upper range of the experiments that have been
performed, one finds the C-60 molecule, which has N = 720 nucleons. The
value 720 is too small for a great impact, and is very much smaller than the
Avagadro number often taken as a value one can say is clearly “macroscopic.”
Because collapse narrows wavepackets, it also leads to a momentum increase
and hence to an energy increase, requiring collapse rates that differ not only
with particle number, but also particle mass (Pearle, 2009). Unfortunately,
experiments capable of testing this hypothesis are not of the sort commonly
performed and currently await testing.
4 Toward the Removal of Conceptual Impre-
cision
In the quantum theory of measurement, experiments are typically understood
schematically as follows. A system S is initially prepared in a quantum state
|Ψ〉 through a series of physical interactions, after which it is measured through
interaction with an apparatus A which is required, in the process, to enter a
state the value of the “pointer” property which itself becomes perfectly corre-
lated with the value of the measured property E of S. A minimal requirement
placed on a measurement is that a certain “calibration condition” be satis-
fied, namely, that if a property to be measured is a real one, then it should
exhibit its value unambiguously and with certainty, cf. (Busch, Lahti and
Mittelstaedt, p. 28). For so-called “sharp observables,” that is, properties
represented by Hermitian operators, this calibration condition is equivalent
to a probability reproducibility condition, namely, that a probability measure
EΨ for a property be “transcribed” onto that of the corresponding apparatus
16
pointer property. Measurement is also taken to include the reading out of the
registered value in addition to the above process of registration of the measured
property by apparatus A. The question of how this pointer “objectification”
is achieved in view of the nonobjectivity of the measured operator, is the first
part of the so-called “objectification problem.”
The second part of the objectivication problem is that of “value ob-
jectification.” A pointer reading refers to the property value of the object
system prior to measurement only if the measured observable was objective
before the measurement. When the observable is non-objective, the question
arises what happens to the system in the course of the measurement. In
general, some state change is unavoidable. The attempts to minimize this
irreducible ‘disturbance’ then naturally lead to the concept of ideality of a
measurement. Ideality requires another characteristic, namely, repeatability:
A repeatable measurement will put the system in a state in which the pointer
reading X refers to an objective value of the measured observable. This is
taken to show that the existence of repeatable measurements is necessary for
realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics (Busch and Jaeger, 2010). For
such measurements, pointer objectification entails value objectification via a
strong value correlation. Such an operational approach to measurement, how-
ever, threatens to mask the objective, physical nature of measurements in
themselves with which Bell was so concerned.
Already in his 1981 article “Quantum theory for cosmologists,” Bell
asked the following rhetorical questions about quantum measurements as un-
derstood within such a scheme.
“If [quantum] theory is to apply to anything but idealized labo-
ratory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less
‘measurement-like’ processes are going on more or less all the time
more or less everywhere? . . . The concept of ‘measurement’ be-
comes so fuzzy that it is quite surprising to have it appearing in
physical theory at the most fundamental level. . . [D]oes not any
analysis of measurement require concepts more fundamental than
measurement? And should not the fundamental theory be about
these...?” (Bell, 1981b)
There is a stark contrast between the everyday “classical” measurements and
quantum measurements. In classical physics, it is certainly the case that sit-
uations that are more or less measurement like are going on all the time ev-
erywhere. The difficulty in the quantum case is that, although measurement
processes should be similarly happening, the outcomes of careful experiments
found by us are consistent with the predictions made using the Schro¨dinger
state evolution, even though the superposition principle should not apply when
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such measurement-like processes are taking place, if human beings are to be
treated just like other physical entities.
If it is indeed the case that measurements, as distinct from subjec-
tive acts of observation, are nonetheless an integral part of physics and not
artificially introduced, the special physical circumstances appearing in mea-
surements must be circumscribed. In the search for physical clarity, we can re-
move anthropocentric elements from our conception of quantum measurement
by finding the set of radically influential objects corresponding to this kind
rather than a generic apparatus for measurements, and thus remove impedi-
ments to progress in isolating the physical conditions underlying measurement
as an objective process. If human beings or other, larger sets of, for example,
biological entities precipitate such physical conditions then the special role of
these entities will have been objectively grounded and natural philosophy will
have been advanced.
It may be helpful to consider the possibility that the set of related
entities as being of a natural kind, because when successful, classes employed
by science do correspond to natural kinds, as in the cases of the sorts of
chemical element, subatomic particle, star, and galaxy (Jaeger, 2014b). This
does not require that these objects be treated as entirely different from other
physical objects, but only assists in our comprehending the implications of
their set of common characteristics. In addition to having particular sets
of natural properties in common with one another, these tokens should be
subject to laws of nature relevant to these properties. One can seek a set of
conditions for being a member of the kind ‘radically influential object’ as a way
of making progress toward an improved realist physics. From the formal point
of view, such influencers are typically assumed to have these characteristics in
common: they i) induce non-unitary state-change and ii) satisfy the conditions
on the systems for providing a robust record of measurement outcomes. The
former relates to the ability to disentangle the joint state of the influencer–
target system and the latter corresponds to the production of Einsteinian
elements of reality. However, as Bell rightly pointed out, more fundamental
properties should be present, of which these properties are consequences. It is
these configurations of fundamental properties that should play a key role in
describing measurement via truly fundamental physical principles.
Some models of measurement, discussed further below, assume that
measurements involve complex measuring systems with a large number of de-
grees of freedom prepared in metastable states. Some natural systems are
known to us to measure—for example, our eyes when connected with our ner-
vous system are such systems. Consider the human optical system taken to
comprise all the material from the eyes to brain, asking whether previously
assumed characteristics are essential. We must look to our understanding of
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the behavior of macromolecules of the optical nervous system when light is in-
cident upon it. Shimony pointed out that the photoreceptor protein of the rod
cells, known as rhodopsin, absorbs photon followed by a biochemical cascade
that is then followed by an electrical pulse in the optic nerve. Shimony notes
that rhodopsin has two components, “retinal, which can absorb a photon, and
opsin, which acts as an enzyme that effects the binding of about five hundred
mediating molecules when it is triggered by the excited retinal,” and asks
[W]hat if the unitary dynamics of evolution of the photon and the
retinal produces a superposition of the cis and the trans conforma-
tions? ...Would not such a superposition produce an indefiniteness
of seeing or not seeing a visual flash, unless, of course, a reduction
occurred further along the pathway from the optic nerve to the
brain to the psyche?” (Shimony, 1991)
The distinct, alternative physical states corresponding to different conforma-
tions of a molecule which can superpose and then enter a specific state when
in contact with the remainder of the nervous system are central to the func-
tioning of this light detection process in a biochemical and electric realm. The
presence of this larger subsystem beyond rhodopsin has an effect of “amplifi-
cation.” Some artificial systems can also mimic the behavior of such natural
radical influencers, and so are exploitable by designers of experiments, e.g.
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) plus electronics. These systems, for example,
are rather complex and involve many degrees of freedom and metastable initial
states. Their effects appears to us to be completed in a way that, for exam-
ple, a Stern–Gerlach magnet alone without a downstream beam-occupation
detector are not. Nonetheless, it has been argued by some, like Asher Peres
(Peres, 1980), that amplication is not required for measurement to take place,
an argument considered below in greater detail.
It is the resolution of questions such as these regarding requirements
that could provide the characteristics of the measurers as a natural kind and
would be a helpful element of any realist treatment of quantum state change,
such as that called for by Bell. Although, like Bell, I am concerned about the
notion of measurement being given an unusually prominent place in physics,
I am much more concerned about notions associated with other terms that
he criticizes in less detail in “Against measurement,” such as ‘observable’ and
‘observation,’ which are clearly laden with the influence of theory and impor-
tantly with a directly subjective, that is, non-physical aspect. This should be
kept in mind when asking the question of which characteristics of the above
example are necessary to an objective understanding of measurement in con-
trast to those which may only be systematically present in the considerations
of physicists only because they themselves are subjects. Although at least
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one human knower is always eventually present who is witness in any success-
ful experiment—or, in less contrived cases, simply observes ongoing natural
events—who happens also to be large, this should not be allowed to beg the
question of whether largeness is a necessary characteristic of a radical influ-
encer in all data-yielding situations.
The matter of amplification, which aids in the delivery of signals per-
ceptible to the human senses, is similarly subtle. Amplification has often been
considered to lead to the objectivity of data produced because, from the statis-
tical point of view, it makes it is very difficult to undo and allows many systems
and observers to be affected by the resulting signal. Despite the presence of
this and other characteristics in many or most familiar situations wherein one
learns about the state of a part of the universe, one must ask whether there is
an objective reason for requiring them in data-yielding situations in general.
Another characteristic mentioned above that is often selected out for special
status is complexity. Notably, it was indicated by DLP, who required in their
treatment that interference “be absent by virtue of the complexity of the con-
sidered system,” with complexity taken to refer to the number of degrees of
freedom of the joint system being large (Danieri, Loinger and Prosperi, 1962).
It is also strongly indicated as a requirement in the above mentioned work
of Peres that “benefited from comments by J.S. Bell” entitled “Can we undo
quantum measurements?” (Peres, 1980). Peres introduces a simple measure-
ment model and with it demonstrates that systems of many degrees of freedom
may effectively obey superselection rules because it is impossible to measure
any phase relationship between two quantum states in the limit of an infinite
number of degrees of freedom. He does does so without requiring another com-
mon candidate requirement, namely, a measurer prepared in metastable state.
The demonstration is a sensible one FAPP, but only FAPP, like many others.
Its value is that it shows that amplification and the presence of metastable
states of the measuring system are not necessary for measurement.
All the commonly assumed characteristics of measurers might be thought
by us to be natural simply because they reflect a subtle and unnoticed anthro-
pocentrism, seeming natural to us only because we scientists are human. Just
because humans are comparative large physical systems and perform measure-
ments in the experimental context does not mean that we must have access to
all measurement results: measurement and the experience of a measurement
are distinct, despite their going together in our human experience. As Bell sug-
gests, must ask ourselves what the purely objective properties of measurement
processes might be that could be solely responsible for, or most significant to
the occurrence of every measurement. We see above, for example, that having
entered the field of a Stern–Gerlach magnet alone is insufficient for the mea-
surement of an appropriate particle’s spin and that, following its action, there
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is a sufficient set of elements present for a successful measurement to take place
when detector plus electronics capture the output beams which can later be
viewed by an experimenter. What is happening in this case? According to the
Schro¨dinger evolution, the effect of the magnetic field is only to entangle the
particle’s spin with its direction; it is usually understood that it is the detector
suite that allows the spin to be identified after the above spin–path correlation
has occurred. The detector, unlike the magnetic field created by the magnet,
is complex, as is the human nervous system.
The one characteristic that appears to survive our removal of unneces-
sary conditions is what appears to be something similar to physical complexity.
It is helpful now to recall, as Shimony noted, that a benefit of stochastic mod-
ification of quantum dynamics was to offer an explanation (“for the general
phenomenon of irreversibility”) at the level of fundamental processes, some-
thing clearly in harmony with Bell’s call for a notion more fundamental than
measurement to account for the emergence of experimental data. We should,
of course, also note the warning that looking to “some aspect of complexity”
has “the danger of confusing epistemological and ontological issues.” Proceed-
ing cautiously, then, we can ask in precisely what sense the ontology of above
situations might be complex.
The commonly recognized measurement-like situations not only involve
a significant number of degrees of freedom but may involve distinct parts. (In-
cidentally, the notion of natural kinds can also assist in distinguishing between
internal and external degrees of freedom, via the notion of fundamental enti-
ties.) An important, well known example relevant to our considerations here
is the Schro¨dinger cat experiment. In this thought experiment, Schro¨dinger
considered an unstable atom A the decay of which would release a hammer H
that, would break a vial containing poison and allowing the cat C, which is
taken as otherwise isolated from the rest of the universe, to be exposed to the
poison (Schro¨dinger, 1935). Aside from the “absurdity” (as he calls it) of the
appearance there of two equiprobable distinct states of the cat’s ‘health’ at a
particular moment in the corresponding overall state
|Ψ〉 = 1
√
2(|undecayed〉A|unreleased〉H|alive〉C+|decayed〉A|released〉H|dead〉C)
(1)
of the joint system, this situation has been viewed (in the terminology to be
replaced in a more precise conception of measurement) as linking the atom
to the ‘macroscopic’ domain (cf. Jaeger, 2014a). One can equally well, as
Bell’s position would relatively favor, view this as a situation involving com-
plex physical circumstances. Clearly, the joint system of A+H+C is more
complex in several respects than that of C taken alone—for example, it has
more subsystems, more degrees of freedom, and involves an interaction of C
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with H. The same can be said for A+H relative to A+H+C, which although
A+H already involves an interaction, involves additional interactions. But, C
itself involves internal interactions. One can ask, for example, whether these
overlooked internal interactions are significant in relation to the complexity
of the situation or otherwise influence measurement, because no-one has ever
observed that sort of alive–dead circumstances in a cat or similar being.
Finally, although the above example continues to be of conceptual im-
portance, one is now in need of further, and more practical examples to make
progress. On the side of practical, rather than thought experiments, let us
consider as an example of what is now available to be explored, some exper-
iments performed relatively recently by Gerlich et al. (Gerlich, Eibenberger,
Tormandi et al., 2011). These experiments have been taken by their creators to
“prove the quantum wave nature and delocalization of compounds composed
of up to 430 atoms, with a maximal size of up to 60 A˚ngstroms, masses up to
m = 6, 910 AMU.” To us, they can be seen to involve something somewhat
similar to the suprising predictions of quantum mechanics in the Schro¨dinger
cat thought experiment. These quantum systems involve thousands of internal
degrees of freedom.
An important point here is the factor in these experiments that differ-
entiates the detector used from conventional detectors operating in the visible
and near infrared, such as avalanche photodiodes and photomultiplier tubes of
past quantum optics experiments, namely, that although those may be single-
photon sensitive, they could not reliably determine the number of photons in
a pulse of light like the photon-number-resolving detectors used in this experi-
ment. Such deterimination is made possible as follows. The experiments used a
calorimetry-based photon detector in which energy is deposited in an absorber
whose thermometer was determined via an observed change in temperature.
Tungsten transition-edge sensors were used and understood to operate in such
a way that tungsten electrons act as both energy absorber and thermome-
ter, and were prepared as to keep the tungsten electrons on the edge of a
superconducting-to-normal-conduction transition; a dependence of resistance
on temperature was set up so as to allow precise thermometry. The change
of current in the voltage-biased detector was measured with a superconduct-
ing quantum-interference device (SQUID) array and analyzed. The results
demonstrated quantum state superpositions of states of certain properties of
large entities, suggesting that the number of degrees of freedom involved does
not correspond to the sort of physical complexity required for induced behav-
ior which would differ from that given by the standard quantum mechanical
desciption.
The detailed study of such experiments, in particular, the array of in-
strumentation and its necessity for successfully providing data describing quan-
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tum phenomena, alongside the study of human sensory systems themselves,
can be expected to yield a more refined understanding of measurement-like
processes within quantum theory and should provide novel insights allowing
more precise vocabulary and concepts to be introduced to improve upon its
basic principles, as John Bell recommended. Novel approaches to measure-
ment in quantum optics, much as in the testing of the Bell–CSHS inequality
itself in the past, can also aid us in transcendending the current limitations
illustrated by the weakness which he identified in quantum physical terminol-
ogy deployed in measurement situations. After such work, one will be in a
better position to consider specific modifications of the fundamental laws of
quantum physics or the quantum state description itself, both of which should
help us progress in the direction that Bell suggested we go in order to advance
natural philosophy.
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